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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
BLAIR SORENSON,
Appellant,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and JEFFERY LYNN
NELSON,

Case No. 15916

Respondents,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent, Nelson sought benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act for injuries he suffered in the course of his
employment while painting one of Appellant's apartments.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The evidence was heard by Kenneth Rigtrup, Administrative
Law Judge, on March 15, 1976.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-77 the

medical aspects of the case were referred to a medical panel.
Before the Medical Panel Report had been completed Judge Rigtrup
left the Commission and was replaced by Administrative Law Judge
Joseph C. Foley.

On April 14, 1978 after reviewing Judge Rigtrup's

notes, the transcripts and the medical panel report, Judge Foley
awarded compensation to the Respondent pursuant to the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

On April 26, 1978 Appellant filed a Motion for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Review.

Upon receiving the Motion for Review, Judge Foley, in

accordance with U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, referred the entire
the Industrial Commission.

case~

The Commission pursuant to U.C.A.

35-1-82. 54 reviewed the entire record including the file containi:r
Judge Rigtrup's notes, the transcript of the record and the
medical pane". report.

On June 19, 1978 the Commission adopted

Judge Foley's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in
their entirety and denied the Appellant's Motion for Review.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks to affirm the Findings and

Orde~

of the Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The general framework of Appellant's statement of fact

is correct as far as it goes, but there are many important ommissil
I
particularly ommissions regarding the employment relationship
between Appellant and Respondent and the nature of Respondent's
disability.

For this reason the facts conce:cning these events art

restated so that one complete picture may be presented.

At all times pertinent to this case Appellant owned ninE·

Duplex
1126 - 1129 Princeton Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
Duplex
548 East 7th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

Numbers [

in parenthesis refer to pages of record.

rental units in Salt Lake City located as follows:

I

Fourplex
1144 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Duplex
1019 - 1921 East Lake Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
House
1032 Downington Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
Fourplex
2303 Green
Salt Lake City, Utah
House
367 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
House
819 West 1400 North
Salt Lake City, Utah
House
656 Hollywood Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
House
550 East 7th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

(126,159,160,161)

During 1975 Appellant collected $28,794.00 from this
network of rental properties and spent $22,683.00 maintaining
and remodeling them.

(161)

Appellant and Respondent met in February, 1975 when they
were taking a class together at the University of Utah.

Appellant

discovered that Respondent could do carpenter work and offered him
$4.00 an hour to repair, remodel and paint apartments.
37, 70, 149)

(28, 30, 36,

Between February and August of 1975 Respondent worked

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for and with Appellant at several rental uni ts.
114, 115, 141)

( 29, 37, 38 1 43_ 48 ,

Appellant specifically designated the date, the

place and how the work was to be performed.
long the work should take.

(34,

48,

He also suggested hoi:

96)

During the middle of August, 197 5, Appellant and his
wife, Mrs. Sorenson, assured Respondent that they had plenty of
work for him on the rental units.

Mrs. Sorenson also told

Respondent he could expect about 40 hours work per month for an
indefinite period of time and that they could afford to pay him
about $160.00 per month.

(31,

82, 92, 148, 154)

From the end of July, 197 5 until August 29, 1975 the
date of the accident, Appellant gave Respondent a series of
specifi::: instructions concerning the painting of the North and
West sides of the fourplex located at 1144 East 5th South. ( 50' 51,
89,149)

Respondent was told that he must use a wire brush and

I

I

scraper, both of which Appellant was to provide, to scrape and br 0~
the woodwork and cinderblock surfaces of the walls.
90, 149)

(50,51,89,

After he had done that he was to apply a coat of primer

and then a final coat of paint using the ladders, brushes and pai:l
to be supplied by the Appellant.

(51,52,89)

As was true in prevll1

work Respondent had performed for Appellant, Respondent's wage wa:
to be $4.00 per hour.

(28,30,36,37,70,149)

Pursuant to Appellant's instructions, On August 27th,
days before the accident, Respondent worked six or seven hours
scraping and brushing the North and West sides of the 1144 Eas'
5th South duplex.

(49, 52)

Thereafter, Appellant inspected the
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the work that had been done and not being pleased with the results,
instructed Respondent by telephone to do the job over.

(52,53,54)

In redoing the work he was to use a brush, soap and water.

(52,53,

54,151)
On the 28th of August, the day before the accident,
because Appellant had not provided the equipment he had promised,
Respondent could not work.

(53)

On the morning of the 29th of August Respondent received
a telephone call from Appellant, who told him that his wife would
give him the soap, bucket and the brushes if he would come over to
his house. (53, 147, 151)
repeate~

During the telephone conversation Appellant

his instructions on how to prepare the cinderblock and

woodwork by scrubbing with soap and water.

(53, 54, 147, 151)

Respondent was again told to prime the workwork with primer which
Appellant had purchased and had stored away for use on this apartment.
(53,54,147,151)

In accordance with Appellant's instructions

Respondent went to Appellant's home, got the bucket, the soap and
the scrub brushes and returned to th2 apartments at 1144 East 5th
South.

Following Appellant's instructions he mixed the soap

solution, climbed the ladder and started scrubbing the cinderblock.
During the performance of the work Respondent fell and sustained
the injuries herein complained of.

-5-

(54-58)
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POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S
FINDINGS THAT APPELLl\_NT WAS AN El·1PLOYER WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE h'ORKJV1..EN' S COMPEllSATION ACT.
The Appellant devoted a substantial amount of time
managing his apartrr.ents.

In order to conduct this business it

was necessary for him to keep substantial records regarding his
income, expenditures, labor performed, hours worked, and allocoU
I

of expenses to the rental units concerned.

(126,161,166-168)

I

He had a substantial amount invested in hand and power tools and
equipment.

(38,47,51,78)

He worked on the apartments himself,

hired and supervised other persons and procured the services of
independent contractors as needed.

(46,48,53,166)

The Utah Supreme Court has defined the term "Employer"
within the meaning of Sec. 35-1-42 to be a term which is "broad
enough to cover all employment relationships".
Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.

Ortega vs. Salt uj

2d 885 (1945).

This

definition is in accordance with the basic purpose of the Act:

I
I

"Construction of statutory definitions.
The definition [
of "employer" contained in the compensation acts, or
statements as to who shall be deemed employers, should
be broadly or liberally construed, in order to eff~ctua:
the purpose of the legislation to afford compensatwn~I
an employee and his dependents, the intention of the
I
legislature being gathered from a consideration of the
5101
whole act.
The basic purpose of the act is the inclu i
of employers, not their exclusion, and doubts of Juns;,JJ
diction must be resolved in favor of inclusion rather;·
1
exclusion,
.
. 99 C.J.S. \·lorkmen's Compens0t1on 58 '

.I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Appellant's rental operations were so extensive that
it must be concluded that he was an employer within the meaning
of the act.
Appellant relies on SommerJille vs. Industrial commission,
113 Utah 504, 196 P. 2d 718

(1948)

in support of his contention

that his extensive rental operations are not a business and hence
that he is not an employer within the meaning of the statute.

The

decision in Sommerville, however, is an exception to the general
rule stated in the Ortega case and is to be confined narrowly to the
facts of Sommerville.

The narrow application of the holding in that

case is indicated by the language of the Utah Supreme Court on Page
721 of the opinion.

The Court said:

"Our holding is limited to the facts of this case, i.e.
th2-: wi1ere a person owns one piece of real estate which
he "rents out" to tenants-;-but does not either personally
or by agent devote a substantial time to the oepration
or management of such property, the owning and renting
of such property does not constitute a business within
the meaning of the workmen's compensation act."
(Emphasis
added)
196 P. 2d at 721
There is a substantial difference between the facts now
before the court and the facts in the Sommerville case.

For this

reason Sommerville should not be controlling on the issues now
before the court.
In Sommerville, a woman who owned a coffee shop also owned
one other building which she rented out to a grocer.

There was no

evidence to show that she spent any more time in renting the building

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

than it took to receive ond c.:i.sli one c!iecl; per month.

She hired

the plaintiff to perform some minor:- repairs on the rented build.

l.,

and after showing him where the building was, did not visit the
work site again until after the work was completed.
supervise the plaintiff in any way,

She did no~

nor did she furnish him with

Thus, her time commitment was substantially less

any tools.

than that of the Appellant in this case.
The facts in this case are very similar to the facts in
Davis vs.

Industrial Commission,

297 Ill.

39, 130 N.E. 333 (19211

In Davis the defendant was a hardware and paint merchant but aloe

I

owned a separate piece of rental property with 15 rental units.
The two plaintiffs were employed by the defendant to clean the
outside walls of the building in which the rental units were

I

'I'hc:y were injured when the scaffold upon which they

Wert•

located.

I
I

standing gave way.

The plaintiff's were awarded compensation

by~
I

arbitrator.

The Industrial Commission and the Circuit Court

affirmed the award of the arbitrator.

I

Upon appeal the defendant

claimed that he did not come within the provisions of the \'/orJ;rner.'1
Compensation Act because he was engaged in the hardware and pain: I
business rather than in the business of maintaining the rental
units.

The Illinois Supreme Court held inter alia that defendant'1

activities in maintaining the rental property also constituted a I
business within the meaning of the \vorkmen' s Compensation statuti I
and affirmed the compensation award.

-8-
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--Appellant also asserts that because he claimed a loss
on the .:ipartmcnts that he was not in business.

This loss is

theoretical because current real estate values are appreciating
at a phenomenal rate rather than depreciating.

Although for tax

purposes Appellant claimed a loss of $4,273.00, in reality he
made a tax free profit of $6,411.00, the difference between his
gross income of $28,794.00 and his business expense of $22,383.00.
( 161)

Because of this claimed tax loss, Appellant also saved tax

on a substantial portion of his government employee's income.

(158)

Appellant reaped a substantial benefit from his apartment and home
rental business.
The ownership and management of Appellant's apartments
and houses constituted a business within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act regardless of net profit or lack of profit.
1

I
I

I

In Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law,
(a)

(1973) Vol. lA, Section 50.44

the rule is stated as follows:
On one point a fair degree of unanimity seems to have
emerged in the absence of a "pecuinary-gain" requirement
(Utah's Workmen's Compensation Statute has none) the
concept of trade or business does not necessarily embrac~
the element of profit seeking . . . the test is not
whether the employer is in business for profit, but
whether he is in business at all.
If he supplies a
product or service it is immaterial what he does w~th
his profit, or whether he expects or gets any profit
at all.
(Emphasis added)

-9-
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POINT II.
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT
RESPONDENT WAS AN EMPLOYEE AND NOT AN H1DEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A. 35-1-43.
A leading Utah case has enunciated the rule as
follows:
"When the employer retains supervision and control
of the work to be performed, the workmen are
employees."
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission,
Utah
, 562 P. 2d 227, 228 (1977)
There was substantial evidence showing that Appellan'.
retained control of every detail of the work to be performed bj
the Respondent.

The clearest example of this is the way the

Appellant supervised Respondent's painting of the 1144 East 5th
South fourplex,

the place where the Respondent was injured.

Appellant told Respondent which sides to paint, where to begin,
how to begin and what tools to use.

( 50, 90)

He furnished the

Respondent

with all of the hand tools, brushes, buckets, a laddo:I

and paint.

( 52, 89)

He inspected the work.

( 52)

He was not

satisfied with the result after Respondent had scraped the walls
with a scraper and wire brush and therefore directed him to w:o:i
surface with soap and water.

At one point Respondent could not

work because the Appellant did not ha'.'e the equipment ready.
Respondent worked for a wage of $4.00 per hour.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

The following two cases are examples of how this court
has applied the law when the facts were virtually identical to
the facts in this case.
In Rustler Lodge vs. Industrial Commission,
562 P.

Utah

2d 227 (1977), Plaintiff, a skilled drywall applicator,

was hired by the defendant, Rustler Lodge, to drywall a storage
area and the ceiling of a conference room in the lodge.
was engaged in the lodging and restaurant business.

The lodge

Plaintiff and

defendant came to an agreement under the terms of which plaintiff
was to furnish his own materials and his own special tools.
Defendant was to furnish a protective drop cloth and a ladder
and was to pay plaintiff at an hourly rate of $8.00 per hour.
Plaintiff fell on a stairway while performing his services at the
lodge and suffered injuries necessitating surgery.

The Industrial

Corrunission ruled that plaintiff was an employee of the defendant
rather than an independent contractor.

This Court affirmed,holding

that the following factors were substantial evidence of control:
(1)

The laborer was taken over the entire job and
shown what service to perform.

-11-
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(2)

The employer furnished him a ladder and pr6tectivE
covering.

( 3)

The laborer was not allowed to commence work on
his first appearance.

(4)

He was paid an hourly wage.

It is also

important

Ibid. at p. 229

to note in the Rustler case that

this Court upheld the Commission's findings even though there
were several facts, not present in this case, which militate a~air''
the finding of control.

(1)

They are:

I

The laborer was to work only once for the employer. :
He was merely to drywall a storage area and the
ceiling of a conference room.

(2)

He supplied all of the materials.

(3)

He supplied all of his own special tools to perforr
the work except for a ladder and a protective
covering.

Ibid.

In Capitol Cleaners and Dyers vs. Industrial Commission,
85 Utah 295, 39 P.

2d 681,

(1935)

a painter was hired by a clean1q

I
and dying establishment for the one-time task of painting a smoke·
stack.

I

The day after the painter began work he fell and was killi

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Industrial commissioi
awarding compensation to the dependents of the painter.

It held

that the painter was an employee and not an independent contracto:
because:
(1)

No estimate of cost or the time submitted to the
cleaning company nor was any called for by t~t
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company.
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(2)

All of the laborer's equipment and supplies were
furnished by the company.

(3)

The laborer, a painter, was paid an hourly rate.

(4)

In all respects except the actual mechanics of
painting the work was to be done under the
supervision and subject to the direction of the
employer.

Appellant relies on Sommerville vs. Industrial Commission,
113 Utah 504, 196 P. 2d 718 (1948)

in support of his argument that

the Respondent in this case was an independent contractor.
Sommerville is easily distinguished on the facts.

In Sommerville

the Appellant merely showed the Respondent what work she wanted
done and left the manner and method of accomplishing the work up
to the Respondent.

After Appellant showed Respondent what she

wanted done, she went back to the coffee shop.
the site again until the work was completed.

She never visited
Ibid. at P. 750.

The facts are vastly different than in this case where
the Appellant worked alongside Respondent, furnished all the tools
and materials, and inspected the work and even made him redo
certain tasks.
Appellant also contends that because Respondent received
credit on the rent that he owed Appellant at a rate of $4.00 an
hour that this was not consideration within the meaning of the
Workmen's compensation Act.

In support of this argument Appellant

citGs Oberhansly vs. Travelers Insurance Company, 5 Utah 2d 15,
294 P.Sponsored
2d by
1093
(1956).
Thefor holding
Oberhansly
case is not
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
digitization providedin
by thethe
Institute of
Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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applicable to this case because in Oberhansly "there was no
agreement to pay wages or salary." Ibid. at P. 1095. The Utah
Supreme Court in the Oberhansly decision clarified the purpose
of requiring consideration.

It said:

"The purpose of the act is to provide compensation
for earning power, lost in industry, and the only
basis for computing compensation is the earning
ability of the employee in the particular employment
out of which the loss arises.
In short, the term
"employee" indicates a person hired to work for wages
as the employer may direct."
(Emphasis added) Ibid.
In contrast, in this case there was a definite agreeme::
between Appellant and Respondent for the payment of a wage or
salary which was $4. 00 per hour.

The Commission used this agree.

upon rate to compute the basis of the Respondent's earning abilr
The fact that Respondent was to be given credit for his hourly
earnings toward his rent does not change the employer-employee
relationship.

This specific designation fulfills the requiremer

called for in the Oberhansly case.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "wages" as:
"Compensation given to a hired person for his or her
services . . . Every form of remuneration payable for
a given period to an individual for personal services
including salaries .
. rent, housing, lodging · · · .
any other similar advantage received from the individua.
employer or directly with resr:iect to work for him." ~
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev., p. 1750.
Thus, the compensation received by Respondent was
consideration within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.

-14-
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POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT'S BMPLOY~1E~'T WAS NOT
CJl.SlJAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT.
. ,,
Appellant claims that Respondent's employment was casual
within the meaning of U.C.A. 35-1-43.

This court defined the

meaning of "casual" in Utah Copper Company vs. Industrial
Commission, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 24 (1920).

In that case a

farmer was hired by the copper company at different times
during the winter to repair an irrigation ditch that was used
by the copper company for mining and milling purposes.
just three

After

days of work the farmer received injuries which

resulted in his death.

The following language of the Supreme

Court further describes the conditions of the farmer's employment.
" . . . there was no regularity of employment
At the time of the employment of the deceased nothing
was said as to the length of time that such employment
would continue.
It was understood that as soon as
the necessary repairs were made upon the canal such
employment would cease." Ibid at p. 29.
Despite the irregularity and uncertain duration of the
farmer's employment with the copper company the Commission granted
an award to his dependents.

The District Court affirmed.

The

Supreme Court affirmed the District Court holding that employment
was not casual if it was necessary to the furtherance of the
employer's business.

Since the copper company needed the water in

the ditch for milling and mining purposes, the repairs to the ditch
performed by the farmer were necessary to the enhancement or
furtherance of the copper company's business.

Thus, his employment

was not casual within the meaning of the Utah Workmen's Compensation
Act.
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Respondent's efforts in repairing and pai:-i ting enhancE;
Appellant's apartment rental business.

Respondent's work incre,

the rental value of the apartments, made them more attractive,
easier to rent, and increased their rental life.

In his treati;

on Workmen's Compensation Larsen deals with the issue of the
repairman as follows:
"Behind all these decisions lies one simple thought:
Maintenance, repairs, painting, cleaning, and the like
are in the course of business because the business
·
could not be carried on without them, and because they
are an expectible, routine and inherent part of carrvi:.
on any enterprise."
Larsen, Workmen's Compensation,- (i
Sec. 51. 23
This Court in Capitol Cleaners and Dyers vs. Industria:
Commission, 39 P. 2d 681 (1935), Supra, adopted the same rationi
In that case the Court held that the employment of a painter to
paint a smokestack, al though the job was of a one-time nature,
nevertheless was not casual, because it was necessary to the
accomplishment of the company's purposes and promoted its busini
Ibid, at p.

681.

The conclusions based upon the facts in the order whic'
is the subject of this appeal are all within the
the Utah cases cited herein.

requirements~

The Industrial Commission should'

affirmed if the fundamental purposes of the workmen's compens~
Act are to be given effect.
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POINT IV.
THE APPELLANT RECEIVED COMPLETE PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS WHERE BEFORE RENDERING THEIR RESPECTIVE
DECISIONS BOTH THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, WHO
ISSUED THE FINAL ORDER, AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE FILE, THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT,
THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT MlD THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
OF THE ADMIIlISTRATIVE LA\·l uUDGE WHO HEARD THE EVIDENCE.
The testimony of the witnesses in this case was carefully
considered by Administrative Law Judge, Kenneth Rigtrup.

After

Judge Rigtrup heard the testimony in this case he resigned his
position with the Industrial Commission to accept an appointment
on the Public Service Commission.
responsiblity for the case.

Thereafter, Judge Foley assumed

The Medical Panel Report was not

received until after Judge Rigtrup had left the Industrial
Commission.

( 266).

The record shows that upon taking over this case Judge
Foley carefully examined the file, the transcript and the
medical panel report.

(309)

The affidavit of Judge Foley, which

supplements the record on appeal, makes it clear that the file
contained Judge Rigtrup's mental impressions, preliminary findings
and conclusions.
At Appellant's request, by way of Motion for Review, the
Industrial Commission made a further perusal of all of the
evidence.

The record shows that pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53 and

35-1-82.54 the members of the commission carefully examined the
transcript, the medical panel report and the file which had been
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prepared by Judge Rigtrup.

( 3 3 2)

The Commission adopted Jue:

Foley's Findings of Fact ctnd Conclusions of Law in their er.t;:
The test to determine if rec1u ircments of due process
have been met in an administrative proceeding is set

16 A c.J.S. constitutional Law, Sec.

forth~

G28, as follows:

"Procedural due process in administrative law is
generally recognized to be a matter of greater
flexibility than when dealinci with strictly judicia'.
tribunals .
. The cardinal test of the presence
or absence of due process of law in an administrati'lc
proceeding is the presence or absence of rudiments
of fair play long known to the law .
The careful review by both the Administrative Law

J~

and the Industrial Commission gave the Appellant due process'
all the procedural safeguards required by law.
Ille Appellant relies heavily on Crow vs.

Commission, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.

2c1 321

(1943),

Industrial

to support hii

contention that he was denied procedural safeyuards.

In that

case the circumstances were much different than those presenci
before the court.
In the Crow

case the record failed to show that the

preliminary finc1ings of the commissioner who hecird the evidenc
were available to the full commission that m,>dc the Findings c
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
however,

Ibid. at P.

322.

In this

CilSe,

the record clearly shOl·.'s th«t both ,Juche Foley ,1nd t'.:

Commission carefully reviewed thc ['rcli:nin,JCy ~inclin0s of Jue:·

-18-
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Rigtrup,

the transcript and the medical panel report.

The review

by the Commission of Judge Foley's findings and order pursuant
to 35-1-85.53 and 35-82.54 was a procedure not available at the
time the Crow case was decided.

Therefore, that decision is not

controlling of the issues in this case.
POINT V.
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE MEDICAL
PANEL REPORT BY FAILING TO OBJECT WITHIN THE
TIME PROVIDED BY LAW.
u.c.A. Sec. 35-1-77 provides that an employer may object
to the findings of a medical panel within 15 days after that report
is mailed to him.

The statute further provides that if objections

are not filed within the 15 day period the report is admitted in
evidence and the Commission may base its findings on the report
of the panel.
Appellant received the Medical Panel Report with written
notice thereupon that he could object to the findings of the
medical panel within fifteen days.

Despite the written warning,

Appellant made no objection to the findings of the medical panel.
His objection is interposed for the first time upon appeal.
By not objecting in the manner provided by law Appellant
waived his objection to the Medical Panel Report. The report then
became the evidence of the case in regard to the extent and
, t • s inJuri
· ·
· e s.
permanency of the Responaen

Utah Rules of Evidence,
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Rule No. 4 provides that before a decision can be reversed or
remanded because of the admission of certain evidence the
Appellant must have interposed a timely and specifically state'
objection.
Appellant also appears to question the nature and ext:
of Respondent's injuries.

The impartial Medical Panel Report

clearly details the seriousness and extent of these injuries.
Panel found that Respondent suffered severe injuries to his
hip and right wrist as a result of the accident.

His

r~

upper~

was broken into fragments which had to be fastened together by
means of a metal compression screw.

(267) His wrist was fractur

in several places causing bone spurs to form and arthritis
set ir..

(267,268)

~

As a result of those injuries, Respondentw:

unable to work for a period of six months after his accident.
In December, 1976, it was necessary to have the compression sc:
surgically removed from Respondent's hip.

( 266)

Shortly therec

Respondent required surgery upon his wrist because of the extE
pain caused by slight movement.

(267)

The last operation was

c

marginally successful and there remains a possibility of the nE
for additional surgery involving the total wrist.

As his

tra~

arthritis worsens, cortisone and pain killers will be requir~.
On the basis of the x-rays and a physical examination·
Medical Panel concluded that Respondent's percentage of perma~:
physical impairment was a 10~; loss of the upper extremeties or
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6% loss of the whole man.
to any prior injury.

None of these impairments were due

(268)

CONCLUSION
Because of the magnitude of Appellant's rental operations
and the various jobs performed by Respondent on these properties,
there is substantial evidence to support the Commissions findings
that he was an employer within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

Moreover, Appellant's close supervision of

Respondent, particularly at the 1144 E. 5th South apartments
constitute substantial evidence of control and establish the fact
that Respondent was an employee within the meaning of the act.
The Appellant received complete procedural due process
where both the Administrative Law Judge, who issued the Findings
and Order, and the Industrial Commission, carefully reviewed the
transcript, the medical panel report and the preliminary findings
of the Administrative Law Judge who heard the evidence.
The medical evidence clearly establishes that Respondent
suffered severe, permanent injuries in the course of his employment.
Appellant waived any objection he had to the introduction of the
medical evidence by failing to object to the Panel Report.

-21-
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The Order of the Industrial Corrunission should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KUNZ, KUNZ

BY:

&

HADLEY

~ u&;'~

- '-t« ~
~
R¢ellJ. Had0f
Attorney for Respondent,
Jeffrey Lynn Nelson

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies,

pos~

prepaid, of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to counsel for
Appellant,

Ro~ald

F. Sysak, Prince, Yates & Geldzahler, 455 S

Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

~day of Sept

1978.
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